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Abstract 
Effective person-centred care requires recognition of the personhood not only of patients but of practitioners. This chapter 
explores the consequences of this recognition for major debates in medical epistemology, regarding clinical reasoning and 
the relationship between research and practice. For too long these debates have been dominated by false dichotomies - 
subjectivity versus objectivity, judgement versus evidence, reason versus emotion. Based on flawed understandings of such 
core concepts as “objectivity” and “engagement”, this distorted dissection of the subject-object relationship has served to 
depersonalise practice. The costs of this depersonalisation include over-regulation and micromanagement of healthcare 
processes by administrators and payers at the same time that information from clinical research remains under-utilized and 
the personhood of patients’ risks being ignored. 
Science is a human practice, founded in a broader conception of human reasoning, ontologically dependent on human 
beings living and engaging with the world in social, emotional and ethical contexts. After looking at different conceptions of 
epistemic hierarchies and their uses in the analysis and evaluation of reasoning in a range of practice contexts, we propose a 
“nested hierarchy” that effectively turns upside-down the flawed evidence hierarchies that have helped to depersonalise 
care. T.S. Eliot’s “wisdom, knowledge, information” scheme (to which we add “data” below “information”) provides a 
model for a person-centred epistemic hierarchy.  This crucial, person-centred inversion represents levels of awareness that 
characterize more or less developed thinking and judgment on the part of the particular practitioner. 
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“The clinical encounter is an interaction between 
persons.” Stephen Henry [1]. 
 
Who is “the person” in person-centered healthcare (PCH)?  
While many authors explain PCH and its importance by 
focusing on what it means to treat “the patient” as a 
person, [2-4] others note the significance of recognizing 
the personhood of practitioners [1,5,6]. This chapter 
explores the consequences of this recognition for major 
debates in medical epistemology, regarding clinical 
reasoning and the relationship between research and 
practice. 
For many years, medical epistemology has been 
dominated by an epistemic hierarchy thought to be 
“objective” - but what does this term mean?  There are 
numerous senses of the term “objective” that render 
objectivity an indispensable aspect of responsible research 
and clinical decision-making. If we predicate the term 
“objective” primarily of a person (rather than an 
impersonal method) and if, by an “objective” person we 
mean someone who puts aside prejudice, thinks critically, 
questions her own assumptions and searches for the truth, 
then it is of course palpably absurd to deny the importance 
of objectivity in all rational thought, including clinical 
reasoning. But the term has a long history, and its current 
usage – in particular its status as an antonym of the term 
“subjective” -  is shaped by assumptions that are so 
fundamental in nature that they typically escape critical 
attention. And yet, these assumptions have framed the 
discussion of medical epistemology in this century [7-9]. 
The conceptual framework shaping our thinking about 
objectivity has led us to focus on a hierarchy of knowledge 
designed to delimit the role of “subjective” or “personal” 
judgment. Attempts to “de-emphasise” intuition, the 
practitioner’s personal experience, tacit and context-
specific knowledge [11-15], and to elevate such skills as 
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“efficient literature searching and the application of formal 
rules of evidence evaluating the clinical literature”, are 
motivated by a concern to see reasoning and practice based 
increasingly on “methodologically sound research” and 
“scientific principles” [11] whose vindication is, precisely, 
that they are untainted by the personal and subjective 
factors that we rely on in our everyday interactions with 
other people [9]. 
Given that practitioners are, in fact, persons, and rely 
on such “subjective” factors as tacit awareness, 
engagement and empathy [1,6] to understand the real 
people with whom they must interact and who they aim to 
assist, discussions have focused on how to “integrate” the 
subjective, cultural and personal factors of human 
knowledge into models of clinical practice that nonetheless 
place objective evidence at the top of a presumed epistemic 
hierarchy [16-18].  
The problems with this integration project (or rather, 
re-integration project, since it only becomes necessary to 
“integrate” these features once a theoretical separation has 
been performed) have led some authors to reject the idea of 
a hierarchy altogether, and to call for a “horizontal 
epistemology” for clinical practice, one which “collapses 
epistemic hierarchies into horizontally ordered libraries of 
clinical knowledge sources, from which ‘library’ the wise 
clinician will need to draw when considering the unique 
personal circumstances of the individual clinical case and 
making decisions with him/her” [10]. Here, we argue that 
the notion of an epistemic hierarchy is indeed 
indispensable, but it needs to be one that reflects the 
concerns of these critics by considering how individual 
practitioners can develop their understanding so as to 
practice more wisely. T.S. Eliot’s “wisdom, knowledge, 
information” scheme, to which we would add “data” below 
“information”, represents a model for a person-centered 
epistemic hierarchy. This is not a hierarchy of 
“impersonal” knowledge, but rather a representation of 
levels of awareness that characterize more or less 
developed thinking and judgment on the part of the 
particular practitioner. 
Far from ‘de-emphasizing’ personal judgment, or 
relegating it to a lower form of evidence than supposedly 
‘impersonal’ sources, we need “an approach to medical 
epistemology that places the concept of judgment at the 
centre, and treats the (primarily moral) project of how to 
cultivate good judgement as its central concern” [8]. 
 
 
Research, paradigms and practice 
 
After centuries of development of the health professions 
dominated by what is commonly known as the ‘medical 
model’, the concept of health care and the appreciation of 
the need to shift the healthcare paradigm from ‘care of the 
patient’ to ‘services to the person’ are remarkably recent in 
origin.  Donald Berwick summarizes the trajectory of this 
evolution in a recent opinion piece in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association [19]. He suggests that the 
history we are addressing can be conceptualized as 
traversing three eras, the first of which extended well into 
this century from antiquity and revolved around the image 
of the medical professional as a (usually) male, dedicated, 
ethically bound but ultimately paternalistic shepherd 
overseeing the health needs of his patients. Era 2, 
characterized by the flowering of clinical and health 
services research, saw the emergence of the need for 
systems development, standardization of services, 
regulation of practice and outcome measurements, all in 
response to the increasing complexity of the healthcare 
environment and the emergence of third party payers as 
essential stakeholders in the system. Berwick [19] 
perceives that the processes of standardization, regulation 
and measurement have reached and surpassed a point at 
which they cease to become assets and begin to become 
major burdens to the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
system. He proposes the necessity for an “Era 3”, in which 
regulation and measurement are relaxed in favor of a shift 
in incentives and, among other changes, an emphasis on 
patient empowerment and autonomy [20]. 
The call for a more user-friendly, consumer-oriented 
and humanistic healthcare environment takes place amidst 
a proliferation of buzz phrases that correspond to 
sometimes very different outlooks and perspectives. These 
include ‘patient-centered care’, ‘relationship centered 
care’, ‘person-centered care’ and ‘whole person care’. In 
most cases, the corresponding constructs are, at best, 
loosely defined and furthermore tend to ignore the role of 
the practitioner as a vital partner in healthcare decision-
making. When an appealing new conceptual framework is 
advanced and defined only in the most generic, rhetorically 
appealing terms, the resulting buzz phrase is prone to 
multiple interpretations and applications whose underlying 
content and motivations may differ widely [21-23]. This 
liability is particularly manifest when the concept in 
question is widely taken up and disseminated. Tanenbaum 
demonstrated that the label ‘patient centered care’ has 
come to refer to at least four different dimensions of 
healthcare [24]. Indeed, when the uptake of a popular label 
is sufficiently broad and the corresponding descriptors 
sufficiently vague, distinctions may break down altogether 
and a semantic ‘unity of opposites’ may emerge.  Hence 
EBM, a movement focused on the importance of research 
literacy in medical education [25], has been portrayed by 
some of its advocates as the preferred label to be used in 
connection with humanistic, patient empowered healthcare 
[26]. 
The jumble of terms, slogans and labels pertaining to 
care of the person that populates the recent healthcare 
literature reflects a confusion on a much deeper level, one 
that calls for attention to the underlying epistemological 
and philosophical constructs. It also relates to a pressing 
dilemma facing healthcare today, namely the gap that 
separates the clinical research enterprise from the domain 
of clinical practice. A premise of this chapter is that our 
inquiry corresponds to this extremely high stakes issue. 
The issue is not an abstract one. It is a matter of the 
relationship of healthcare, as delivered to actual 
populations and to actual individual people by actual 
healthcare professionals and their ancillary staff members, 
to the products of clinical research and to the expanding 
wellspring of biomedical knowledge. To address it, we 
need to ask questions such as “what does it mean to use 





information from research in the course of healthcare 
practice and policymaking?” 
Failure to translate the results of research into useful 
applications in practice is not unique to healthcare. A 2012 
US National Science Foundation report summarized the 
findings of a select committee on the use of social sciences 
research in public policy.  It concluded that the ability to 
demonstrate consistent use of research in practice is 
problematic and that no progress could be demonstrated 
since the report of a similarly tasked NSF committee report 
from 30 years before [27].  Within healthcare, a relatively 
straightforward, if imperfect, metric for assessing use of 
research is provided by the extent to which clinical practice 
conforms to the recommendations of published evidence-
based  guidelines. Surveys have consistently reported the 
adherence in practice to clinical guideline 
recommendations, including those supported by scientific 
research, to be marginally over 50% at best [28-32]. As a 
result of such observations, a veritable cottage industry 
seeking  ‘fixes’ for the dilemma has emerged. Knowledge 
translation and implementation science constitute practical 
disciplines supported by research agendas aimed at the 
development and facilitation of tools and methods capable 
of bridging the research-to-practice gap. These emergent 
disciplines encompass a wide range of perspectives and 
conceptual outlooks which vary across different healthcare 
disciplines [33]. Unfortunately, successes attributable to 
these efforts have been few and far between. For example, 
despite internationally coordinated efforts to develop and 
validate standards for patient-centered decision support 
tools, clinicians refrain from utilizing them [34] and, even 
when they do, their use proves to be only marginally 
effective [35]. 
The governing premise of this chapter is that realization 
of Berwick’s vision of an “Era 3” in healthcare, 
achievement of a healthcare of the person, and fruitful 
closure of the gap between research, policy and practice, 
all require conceptual and practical closure of a gap that 
lies even deeper.  Western philosophical, scientific and 
social systems are characterized by a fundamental dualism 
[36-38]. Though the term is most closely associated with 
Descartes [39,40], the history of this conceptual divide pre-
dates his work. This dualism is conditioned by our deep-
rooted, historical understanding of the relation between 
knowing subjects and the known world, and is reflected in 
a diverse range of philosophies. Plato reveals it in his 
tripartite division of the soul, setting Reason above 
appetites, emotions and imagination in any true pursuit of 
knowledge [41]. Aristotle reveals it in his Rhetoric 
(3.1.1404a3-8) [42] where he says we should “aim at 
nothing more in a speech than not to give pain or delight. 
For it is just that a case be fought with the facts 
themselves, so that everything else outside of proving them 
is superfluous.” Descartes entrenches the same 
dichotomies for the modern age: it is the subject, with his 
faulty judgments, who must ‘get out of the way’ if the 
object in itself is to be grasped [43]; similarly, for Locke 
and Hume, though these two come from the opposite side 
of the Rationalist/Empiricist divide to their predecessor, 
Descartes [44,45]. In all, there is cross-party agreement 
that knowledge-seeking is an enterprise only for the 
subject in the abstract, his objective reason divorced from 
all other features of his humanity, including value-
judgments, intuitions, feelings and all things “personal” 
[9]. 
Recognition of the relevance of the dualistic dilemma 
within Western philosophy to resolving the multi-level 
fragmentation of the healthcare enterprise abounds in the 
biomedical literature [46-48]. In what follows, we will 
attempt to establish the relevance of the long-established 
opposition between subject and object to the ways in which 
medical research is characterized, practiced and ultimately 
applied. We hope to identify how the historically 
misconstrued opposition of subject and object impacts on 
the provision of a proper and adequate epistemology of 
person-centered healthcare.  Specifically, we will show the 
relevance of this issue to a central requirement of PCH, 
that is, the importance of a relationship-centered 
understanding of healthcare interactions in which 
practitioners, patients, families, significant others and the 
full array of health caretakers, play crucial and irreducible 
roles in the process. We will identify the necessity to such 
an understanding of what we will term an ‘evolutionary 
hierarchy of information and knowledge’. We will briefly 
illustrate these concepts drawing on established precedents 
within the healthcare arena of non-dualistic solutions to the 





To enter the world of discussion and debate pertaining to 
the philosophy of medicine is to risk becoming immersed 
in an ocean of ‘isms’, trends, proposed constructs and 
ideologies. For the purposes of this discussion, we need to 
avoid entanglement in philosophical intricacies so as to 
bring clarity to the points most relevant to healthcare. At 
the same time, the historical conflict between empiricism 
and rationalism is vital to a serious consideration of the 
unsatisfying gap between clinical research and healthcare 
practice. It is a conflict that has undergone multiple 
iterations and resurgences going back to antiquity [40]. 
Empiricism has no doubt been the greatest influence on 
the modern conception of science, scientific method and, 
by extension, the biomedical sciences and the conceived 
relationship between medical practitioner and patient. In 
itself, empiricism simply consists in a thesis which posits 
sense experience as the primary source of knowledge. 
Reason, too, has its place in the development of a body of 
knowledge, but its role is deemed to be secondary: reason 
sets to work once sensory information has been gathered. 
Sense experience provides the ‘raw materials’ from which 
reason extrapolates. To clarify, to make use of empirical 
evidence is not to commit oneself to the epistemic premise 
of empiricism: the rationalist may stick his hand out of the 
window to see if it is raining, without thereby 
compromising his philosophical position.  What 
differentiates the rationalist from the empiricist is the belief 
in the primacy of reason over sense experience: reason 
supplies us with a framework of principles which help us 
to make sense of our experience. Thus, just as a rationalist 
Wyer & Loughlin 
 
Person Centred Healthcare and Clinical Research 
 
238 
can look to see if there is evidence of rain, an empiricist 
can acknowledge the importance of human reasoning, and 
can accordingly be a mathematician or logician without 
abandoning his empiricist premise. The point of difference 
between these philosophic traditions rests only on the 
primacy of sense over reason, or of reason over sense. 
By the time of Locke, the battle was well underway for 
the ‘soul’ of science, with the British empiricist school 
contesting the rationalist, Cartesian conception of science 
as subject to foundational principles unearthed by 
philosophers.  Locke abruptly reverses this ‘power 
relation’, stating: “It is ambition enough to be employed as 
an under-labourer to the sciences, clearing the ground a 
little, and removing some of the rubbish which lies in the 
way to knowledge” [44]. Locke had in mind the great 
advances of such as “the incomparable Mr Newton”, 
whose system could not have advanced under the fetters of 
Cartesian rationalism, and so, historically, with the rising 
star of Newton, the empirical conception of science, 
shaped by Locke, came to predominate. 
The story does not end there though, for after Locke’s 
brand of scientific realism came Berkeley who forged the 
link between empiricism and idealism, whereupon Hume 
intervened to draw out the potentials for skepticism that 
logically unfold from a strict empiricist starting point 
[45,49]. For Hume, empirical observation is the only 
source of knowledge, and reason is no more (and no less) 
than logical deduction. So the realm of the known is 
strictly limited to propositions that either report 
observations or follow deductively from such propositions 
- and Hume was very clear that many of our everyday, 
common-sense claims do not follow strictly from empirical 
observation [45]. 
Hume’s influence on the developing conception of 
science is no less than was Locke’s and is felt particularly 
through the rise of the logical positivist movement in the 
early 20th Century. The application of Hume’s strict 
empiricism to understanding the methods of science was to 
become the hallmark of the logical positivist approach. It 
resulted in that school’s rigid adherence to multiple 
conceptual dichotomies: fact vs. value, object vs. subject, 
reason vs. emotion, science vs. art. These oppositions have 
undoubtedly generated problems for activities that at once 
strive to be ‘scientific’ and yet also deal with the 
distinctively human [8,9]. 
There is a general question to be asked as to whether 
any substantial body of knowledge, especially one with 
human-oriented practical applications, can be built upon a 
foundation that leans so readily towards skepticism and it 
is this insight that has prompted many credible figures, 
such as Noam Chomsky [50], to turn towards rationalism 
in some form.  Nevertheless, the problems we face in 
constructing a coherent account of research, and its 
relationship to human activity, go well beyond the 
rationalist/empiricist schism: both sides are affected by the 
same construction of the relationship between subject and 
object that permeates the thinking of Plato and Aristotle, of 
Locke and Descartes, of positivism, logical positivism, and 
their many critics [7-9]. It was Descartes’ view that reason 
could generate substantive knowledge of the real world 
that presented, for him, the solution to otherwise 
intractable skeptical problems [43]. Hume’s far more 
limited account of what reason could do led him to be far 
more skeptical precisely because he treated knowledge as 
generated purely by ‘observation plus deduction’ [45]. 
What both thinkers have in common is a failure to consider 
any other factors as possible generators of real, substantive 
knowledge - each takes it as read that being embedded in a 
social context, engaging with other human beings in 
empathic relationships, valuing others, feelings and tacit 




It is arguable that in many areas of scientific research, 
advanced theoretical, interpretive and imaginative thinking 
is essential, such that the assumed dichotomy between 
“objective” and “subjective” forms of thinking 
characterized above makes good scientific practice, in 
many areas of science, impossible [9,51,52]. However, it is 
also possible to argue that medicine is not a science but 
rather, as Montgomery puts it, “an interpretive practice that 
relies on clinical reasoning” [53]. Medical education is not 
scientific training and essentially involves the development 
of characteristically human, moral capacities [54]. 
Whether we admit it or not, our position on such 
matters is determined by assumptions properly 
characterized as philosophical in nature. The healthcare 
literature abounds with labels borrowed from philosophical 
currents and tendencies in the context of defining specific 
activities and practices. Such labeling is undertaken using 
relatively loose definitions of the philosophical trends in 
question. As one example, a loosely framed notion of 
‘rationalism versus empiricism’ in medicine and healthcare 
considers that the former has to do with the knowledge of 
mechanisms of disease whereas the latter, empiricism, 
pertains to the outcomes of individual patients [40]. Such 
examples reflect at least a latent awareness on the part of 
their authors of the implicit relevance of philosophy to 
issues of applied science.  
Philosophy is concerned with foundational assumptions 
and methods. It provides conceptual analysis for 
clarification and for the avoidance of muddles and 
unnecessary misunderstandings. It also brings to bear a 
rich history of ideas which sheds light on the concepts and 
preconceptions which govern our thinking now. Hence, it 
is not possible to avoid having, at least implicitly, a 
philosophical stance of some kind, even though it is 
possible to avoid making it explicit. By extrapolation, it is 
not possible to have a ‘purely scientific’ position, one 
without implicit philosophical commitments and supported 
only by scientific evidence. All scientific activity is 
underpinned by some theory of what science itself actually 
is and of its proper assumptions, methods and limitations. 
Such a theory is essential if criteria are to exist that allow 
the differentiation between science and non-science, or 
even good and bad science. Recognizing these potentials 
for muddle, and acknowledging the influence of age-old 
entrenched philosophical theories, we can move forward in 
a more productive way to address the relationship between 
clinical research and person centeredness.   
 
 







So far, all of the philosophical and epistemological trends 
and tendencies we have considered share one important 
thing in common: they all treat the world of thought and 
experience and the world of material things, the knower 
and the known, as ultimately separate, and even 
irreconcilably so. Social constructivism provides a 
framework that can be argued to overcome, or at least side-
step, the difficulties produced by a too rigid opposition of 
subject and object, of knower and thing known in a fashion 
that has bearing on the salient issues of medicine and 
healthcare [55,56]. Social constructivism has important 
roots in the 20th Century phenomenology movement 
associated with Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and 
others. It is in part because of these diverse influences that 
interpretations of social constructivism can diverge greatly 
[56]. It is proposed here that social constructivism and its 
parent, phenomenology,  in tandem with the emergence of 
a new approach to philosophy of science embodied in the 
neuroscience of Maturana [57], Varela [37], Flores [38] 
and the organizational theorist Nonaka [58], point to an 
alternative approach to the problems that have otherwise 
befuddled Western philosophy. An important aspect of the 
approach in question is the acceptance of the relevance of 
key elements of Eastern thought, in tandem with the tenets 
and accomplishments of Western philosophy and science 
[37]. The epistemological framework  of social 
constructivism is  also embodied in the educational 
philosophy and practice of the renowned Brazilian 
educator Paolo Freire [59,60]. In the pages that follow, 
after some clarifications and considerations of hierarchies, 
we will explore some of the ramifications of a social 
constructivist orientation to health, medicine and 
healthcare, as well as some of the initiatives to date that 
have reflected such an approach. 
 
 
Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM): 
The Ultimate Confounder 
 
The evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement has 
insinuated itself as a protagonist and stakeholder in debates 
regarding the epistemology of science and its relationship 
to the practical use of clinical research in healthcare 
[17,18]. We define EBM as the educational movement to 
enhance the clinical research literacy of physicians, 
including physicians in training, introduced by the 
McMaster University based EBM Working Group in 1992 
[11]. The label “evidence-based” had been introduced 
earlier by David Eddy in the context of a discussion of the 
use of research to inform clinical guideline efforts [61,62]. 
However, the EBM manifesto [11] was particularly 
effective in generating substantial attention and 
controversy [62]. This, together with EBM’s emphasis on 
information from clinical trials and on hierarchies of 
clinical research evidence, not to mention the distinct 
inclination towards ‘empire building’ on the part of EBM 
founders that would become more evident over time [17], 
rapidly led to a tendency in the literature to equate the term 
‘evidence-based medicine’ with the entire interface 
between clinical research and healthcare, including the 
clinical research enterprise itself [25,26,63].   
Blurring the boundaries of the EBM initiative, as it was 
actually formulated, has served to obscure the 
epistemologically relevant features of the movement. What 
needs to be addressed in the context of this chapter is the 
role of EBM in corrupting the notion of a ‘hierarchy of 
evidence’. To do this we need to recognize EBM as an 
expression of logical positivism within the arena of 
healthcare.   
The EBM literature itself is sparse when it comes to 
explicit reference to philosophical currents.  One of the 
few direct statements regarding epistemological orientation 
from EBM founders comes from Sackett, who identified 
the clinical epidemiology movement that led to EBM, as 
he conceived it, as ‘nominalist’ in orientation [64]. This 
assertion, which appeared prior to the public launch of the 
EBM movement, reinforces the characterization of EBM 
as an expression of logical positivism [39,56]. Many 
features of EBM demonstrate that logical positivism is the 
best fit as an underlying epistemological framework. 
Among these are the probabilistic emphasis on statistical 
data as an aid to diagnosis. EBM, as an educational 
initiative directed at clinical physicians, offered a set of 
evaluative and interpretive principles derived from the 
established literature on clinical research methodology 
[65]. The criteria, such as randomization, concealment of 
randomization and blinding, which were advanced as the 
basis for assessment of the quality of evidence supporting 
the validity of study results, were specific to particular 
clinical research designs. They had been developed from 
logical considerations pertaining to factors that could bias 
such results. As such, the process of their selection 
conforms to what has been characterized as the “logical” 
side of “logical positivism” [66]. More recently, 
investigators close to the EBM movement have taken great 
pains to subject these quality criteria themselves to 
empirical validation. An extensive body of research has 
involved comparison of the results of individual trials 
included within systematic reviews based on compliance or 
non-compliance with specific criteria. A preponderance of 
this research has suggested that such methodological 
characteristics, when present, are associated with smaller, 
and presumably more plausible, estimates of effect [67,68]. 
We can recognize the research that targeted the criteria 
used within the instructional framework of EBM as the 
basis of evaluating the quality of clinical studies as fully 
consistent with the logical positivist framework [39,69]. In 
fact the entire framework advanced as the lexicon of EBM 
in the early 1990’s [65,70,71] is consistent with this 
epistemological framework. Also compatible are the 
attempts to adjoin domains other than that of information 
from clinical research into the proposed EBM paradigm. 
As elaborated by Kolakowski [69], a central precept of 
logical positivism is that all sciences, including the social 
sciences, can and should be unified around a single set of 
specifications, specifications that are in turn compatible 
with those posited as essential to the advancement of 
knowledge within the natural sciences. This would seem to 
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be the most satisfying interpretation from a philosophical 
standpoint of certain, otherwise bewildering, EBM 
founders’ proposals, subsequent to the initial elaboration, 
to ‘expand’ the EBM perspective to encompass patient 
values and preferences and the elements of clinical 
expertise [72,73].  
The proposed adjustments to the original EBM 
prescription were advanced without any substantive 
attempts to modify the original perspective on medical 
knowledge and teaching.  The instructional frameworks 
informing workshops in EBM overseen by its original 
founders remained unchanged [25,74] and, notably, what is 
otherwise understood to constitute ‘medical knowledge’, 
that is, knowledge of the pathophysiological mechanisms 
of health and disease, was never added to the formulation. 
More recently, even more extravagant propositions aimed 
at advancing and expanding the EBM paradigm have 
suggested direct incorporation of patients’ values, 
preferences and experiences, if not their actual personhood, 
into the EBM hierarchy of evidence [16,75]. 
In certain circumstances, EBM founders and advocates 
do appear inclined to break out of the confines of a purely 
empiricist conceptual framework. We have elsewhere [76] 
described a process in which, at the point that such a 
framework comes up against irreconcilable contradictions 
in the course of pursuing a line of development, it 
transforms itself effectively into a rationalist construct as a 
means of getting beyond the constraints of the original 
epistemic stance.  The relationship between EBM and the 
clinical guideline movement seems to reflect such a 
phenomenon [77], particularly when the specifics of the 
Grading Recommendations Assessment, Development and 
Evaluation (GRADE) developed by senior EBM founders 
are considered [78].  
To illustrate the point in more detail, the notion 
advanced by EBM founders that information from clinical 
research, or ‘evidence’, speaks for itself with need only for 
a minimal degree of interpretation, although later 
abandoned by some EBM advocates [79], constituted an 
avowedly empiricist epistemic stance [8]. Further 
exemplifying the ultimate limitations of EBM as a 
paradigm for medical education and practice, after twenty 
years of development characterized by widespread 
successful incorporation of training in EBM skills into 
medical curricula at all levels of training, a multitude of 
studies of educational effectiveness failed to demonstrate 
any impact of EBM on physician behavior, clinical 
practice or patient outcomes [78,80,81]. In the interim, 
many of the original founders and developers of the EBM 
movement have turned their efforts to the development and 
implementation of clinical guidelines and related principles 
of implementation science and knowledge translation as 
means of closing the gaps between clinical research, health 
policy and clinical practice [78]. Clinical guidelines are 
complex instruments and the process of securing their 
uptake and adherence is more complex still. The overall 
process encompasses many dimensions and domains 
including the incorporation of the perspectives of sundry 
stakeholders to guideline use [82]. These domains of 
consideration are not easily reducible to the kinds of 
logical constructions that pass muster within a rigorously 
logical or probabilistic framework. Hence, the 
aforementioned shift in focus of activities, from the 
original EBM paradigm of change in clinical practice as an 
automatic consequence of education for research literacy, 
to the world of clinical guideline development and 
implementation, can be seen as an attempt to move away 
from rigid empiricism towards approaches more grounded 




A Hierarchy of Hierarchies 
 
Having characterized the epistemic basis of the EBM 
movement, we are now ready to undertake consideration of 
the sometimes vexing matter of hierarchical schemes of 
research evidence, information and knowledge which EBM 
has played a prominent role in shaping and perhaps 
corrupting. 
The issue of hierarchies has been a prominent one in 
discussions of healthcare, particularly hierarchies 
involving the place of research evidence within the policy 
and clinical decision-making process. Decision-makers are 
persons, and those persons include practitioners, whose 
ability to engage in decision-making relationships with 
service users as equals, employing empathy and respect, is 
a crucial feature of providing acceptable care - certainly of 
practicing in a way that can meaningfully be called 
‘person-centered’. It is a pivotal issue and one that may 
well define the epistemic viability of conceptual 
frameworks aimed at illuminating the possibility of a 
healthcare of the person, rather than of the ‘patient’ or of 
an impersonal population. Epistemic hierarchies that 
‘downgrade’ features of professional awareness vital to 
best practice are, simply, inadequate characterizations of 
the relationship between knowledge and practice in 
healthcare - they are (as we will demonstrate) ‘low-grade’ 
hierarchies. 
More generally, the process through which knowledge 
of ourselves and the universe develops can be seen as a 
matter of recognizing  order, expressed in the language of 
structure and mechanism, and of identifying and creating 
relationships between those real, independent objects and 
our thoughts and concepts. The concept of hierarchy has 
traditionally played a key role in helping us ‘structure’ our 
understanding of the world and, not  surprisingly, plays a 
key role in the development of science. Our purpose here is 
to explore the roles that hierarchical notions have played in 
the course of discussions bearing on the epistemology of a 
healthcare of the person.    
As before, to explore the issue we need first to 
delineate what we are talking about sufficiently to avoid 
ambiguity of usage.  The term ‘hierarchy’ may be 
appropriately applied to a variety of distinct contexts and 
relationships. For example, it may denote a simple 
ordering process, such as an organizational command 
structure. Although it constitutes important information for 
anyone who needs to navigate the organization from within 
or without, the arrangement is ultimately idiosyncratic. A 
‘hierarchy’ may also refer to an ordering, or ranking, based 
upon an underlying  quantitative principle such as years of 
education, the number of language fluencies etc.   A still  








Figure 1   (A.) A ‘designated’  hierarchy  such as a standard organizational chart. The ordering 
reflects criteria selected by the organizational leaders and is not objectively reproducible. (B.) An 
‘ordered’ hierarchy in which the ranking of the elements is based upon well-defined properties of the 
elements. The ordering principle is externally defined and reproducible. (C.) A ‘nested ‘ hierarchy in 
which successive levels subsume the properties of the preceding levels. The ordering reflects a 
developmental principle which may be externally defined or, in the case of an ‘evolutionary 
hierarchy’ intrinsically determined. The arrows indicate the directionality of hierarchical 




more complex notion can be conceptualized as a nested or 
‘evolutionary’ hierarchy, in which each successive stage 
subsumes the entirety of the lower stages. For example, 
subatomic particles comprise the ‘building blocks’ that 
comprise inorganic matter which in turn comprises the 
basis of organic molecules leading to life forms, and then 
to creatures with advanced reasoning and creative abilities. 
Strictly, within the evolutionary paradigm, the governing 
principal of the hierarchy is the process through which 
successively higher levels are generated from the lower 
levels. However, in all cases of a ‘nested’ hierarchy, the 
emergent properties of the higher levels are not reducible 
to those of the lower, even though content within the lower 
levels is fully subsumed within that of the higher levels 
[26,37,57]. 
To expand on this idea, these notions of hierarchy can 
be represented in terms of set theory (Figure 1).  An 
example of a ‘designated’ hierarchy (A) is the array of 
individuals within an organizational map. In this case a 
simple set is comprised of all personnel within an 
organization who have designated leadership or executive 
roles combined with a designated ranking of authority. The 
chains of command and reporting may be intricate and will 
generally not conform to a simple ordering principle. 
Rather, multiple factors will contribute to the various 
choices and designations which may in fact be extraneous 
to individuals’ experience or qualifications and may reflect 
entirely different criteria for different individuals.  
Importantly, knowledge of one such organizational scheme 
does not justify assumptions that might be made regarding 
the structure of a different organization. 
A somewhat more advanced hierarchical framework 
(B) reflects the application of an external criterion to the 
members of the set. This is characteristically a quantitative 
attribute. The hierarchy of study designs introduced as part 
of the inaugural report of the Canadian Task Force on the 
Periodic Health Examination [83] constituted an attempt at 
the establishment of such a hierarchy. From the standpoint 
of a ‘hierarchy of hierarchies’ framework, a hierarchy 
based on application of a simple external criterion, 
consistently applied, generates a higher level of knowledge 
than does one based on simple designation. Flawed as it 
was, over the ensuing decades the Canadian Task Force 
scheme made it possible to know something about other 
‘evidence based’ guidelines, particularly with respect to the 
kind of research that had been performed on specific 
questions across a broad range of clinical settings.   
Figure 1C illustrates the nested hierarchy.  Within it, 
each successive stage subsumes the contents of the 
previous one.  In terms of conventional set theory notation, 
if A, B, C and D are successive stages in a hierarchical 
assent, then {(A ⊆ B) ⊆ C} ⊆ D, etc. The criteria by which 
the contents of the elements are determined are intrinsic, 
albeit a ‘knower’ is required to recognize and define the 
corresponding hierarchy, including the process through 
which each successive stage is generated from the earlier 
stages. Strictly, in an evolutionary hierarchy, such a 
knower is itself the product of self-organizing, emergent 
principal. In any case, a nested hierarchy uniquely 
conforms to knowledge of processes, as opposed to fixed 
or arbitrary ordering principles, and as a result it is aligned 
with the process through which knowledge itself emerges 
from the experience of self and of the world.   
It is perhaps important to note that the validity and 
integrity of a hierarchy conforming to any of the described 
specifications should be considered to be attributable only 
to the consistency of application of those specifications. 
For example, the validity of an ordered hierarchy qua 
hierarchy depends only upon the intrinsic characteristics of 
the elements, not upon the validity of the premises 
underlying the externally imposed ordering principle. 
Of the three types of hierarchy we have described, we 
are primarily concerned with the second and third which 
we can call the externally ordered and the nested 
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hierarchies, respectively. Both bear an important 
relationship to the issues regarding person-centered 
healthcare that we are discussing. Much attention, and 
criticism, has been focused on the externally ordered, study 
design-based hierarchies of evidence that have appeared 
over the years since the Canadian Task Force published its 
first report on the periodic health examination [83]. These 
hierarchical concepts preceded the dawn of the EBM 
movement [78]. Despite their adoption, in various 
iterations, by that movement, they were neither introduced 
by nor properly define it. What the EBM movement did 
contribute was a constantly changing corruption of the 
integrity of hierarchical ordering from the standpoint of the 
concept of either an ‘ordered’ or an ‘evolutionary’ 
hierarchy conforming to either B or C in Figure 1.   
Returning to the design-based, ‘ordered’ hierarchy of 
evidence as introduced in 1977 [83], this was based on a 
seemingly straightforward, if ultimately challengeable 
premise, namely that the method of allocation of human 
subjects within a comparative study framework is related 
to the likelihood of bias in the results, due to the varying 
ability to adequately control for confounding and 
modifying factors in the study population. It assumed that 
randomized allocation, which potentially is able to control 
for both known and unknown confounders, would be 
inherently superior to an observational design in which the 
researcher has no direct control over allocation. Similarly, 
an observational design based on a single, coherent, 
population, such as a prospective cohort study, was 
considered to encompass, more effectively, controls against 
confounding than one in which the subjects to be compared 
are drawn from different populations, such as in a case-
control study. Historically, there proved to be some 
vindication for these over-simplified assumptions. 
The era of randomized trials and the hierarchies of 
methodology based on them was ushered in, not as an 
ideological, or even an epidemiological movement, but 
rather as a pragmatic response to one of the most 
prominent pharmaceutical industry generated debacles in 
the post-World War II period, namely the thalidomide 
scandal [84]. Hundreds of dramatically deformed babies 
were born of mothers who had been urged to take the drug 
by their doctors at the behest of the marketing pressures 
exerted by the manufacturer. The scandal led to US 
congressional action spearheaded by then US senator Estes 
Kefauver, who drafted 1960’s legislation which required 
trial evidence of both efficacy and safety as requirements 
for approval of new drugs by  the Food and Drug 
Administration [25]. The requirement was for 
demonstration of efficacy and safety under research 
conditions; hence, the requirement for controlled trials and 
randomization.  So, the driving impulse was political and 
pragmatic, more than it was ideological or epistemological. 
To be sure, clinical epidemiologists such as Archie 
Cochrane lent their support [12]. Furthermore, clinical 
guideline efforts soon adjusted to the ascendancy of the 
randomized trial in their approach to rating the quality of 
research evidence related to healthcare recommendations 
[83]. By the time EBM was launched in 1992, the 
dominance of the RCT over clinical research had been 
established for decades and in no way constituted its 
defining characteristic from an epistemological standpoint. 
Although properly conforming to an ordered hierarchy, 
the design based framework for rating the quality of 
comparative clinical research studies was ultimately 
problematic. Many other factors to do with the design and 
conduct of such research are capable of undermining 
controls to prevent biased results and may invalidate the 
ranking of approaches to subject allocation and selection. 
The first attempts to revise and improve the hierarchy of 
evidence on the part of the educators and epidemiologists 
who served as the core of the EBM movement were aimed 
at incorporating aspects of the sample size, consistency of 
results across studies and perceived thresholds for 
assessment of clinical significance of the magnitude of 
effect into the design based scheme [13,14]. The results of 
these first forays into the arena of grading evidence for 
decisions and recommendations, although complex and 
unlikely to be adopted, were nonetheless confined to 
tangible aspects of clinical research and hence defensibly 
conformed to an ordered hierarchy within a well defined 
set. They were, however, soon to be superseded by a 
proposed scheme that could not be so defended [15]. 
In 2002, the inaugural compendium of the JAMA 
Users’ Guides series, the flagship series of the EBM 
movement [65], proposed a hierarchy of evidence to be 
used in healthcare decision making that incorporated 
elements entirely foreign to intrinsic criteria for rating and 
ordering study quality [15]. Moreover, those elements 
corresponded to an entirely different construct, unique to 
the EBM movement, which had originally triggered the 
vehement opposition to the EBM educational initiative on 
the part of humanistically-oriented spokespersons that was 
voiced in major medical journals [85]. Specifically, the 
scheme included systematic reviews, randomized trials and 
observational studies positioned above information drawn 
from studies of physiological parameters in health and 
disease and also above clinical observations.  The latter 
two elements, which can hardly be considered to be 
inherent to any clinical research design, invalidate the 
scheme from the standpoint of the definition of an 
externally ordered hierarchy, there being no definable 
category encompassing the elements of the set and no 
elaborated principle governing their order. Furthermore, 
these “foreign” elements reflect the invasion into an 
ostensibly design-based hierarchy on the part of a radically 
different construct, which had been interjected with the 
original announcement of the EBM initiative in 1992  [11]. 
The latter had proposed a restructuring of knowledge as it 
pertains to clinical practice and teaching, namely that the 
knowledge of the pathophysiology of health and disease 
and also knowledge born of clinical experience of 
individual practitioners, such as accumulated by healthcare 
professionals in the course of practice, be ‘de-emphasized’ 
relative to information drawn from clinical research. This 
restructuring is represented in Figure 2A. Subsequent 
publications by the EBM core group [15,17] have 
confirmed that the intended position for clinical knowledge 
and practitioner acumen within the proposed structure was 
at the very bottom of an ascending, three step hierarchy 
[86]. The ultimate incoherence of the resulting construct 
[86] and its incompatibility with the precepts of actual 
clinical practice [85,87] have been abundantly elaborated 
in the literature. It will best serve our current  purpose to  






Figure 2 Illustrating the erroneously ordered hierarchy of knowledge originally implied by the EBM 
literature (A) counterposed to  corrected ranking (B). The latter conforms implicitly to a properly 
designated ‘nested hierarchy’ within which focused information from clinical research is filtered 
through the comprehensive array of medical scientific knowledge, including the knowledge of 
biochemistry, physiology, etc in health and disease and is ultimately integrated within the social and 
relational domain of contextualized knowledge from which healthcare decisions and choices are 
made. (Figure contributed by Dra. S. Silva) 
 
 
focus on the issue raised by the ‘upside down’ ordering 
[86] of the medical knowledge hierarchy posited by EBM 
in 1992. 
The positioning of information from clinical research at 
the top of a hierarchy of knowledge, subordinating what is 
conventionally understood to constitute “medical 
knowledge”, that is, knowledge of human pathophysiology 
in health and disease, as well as other areas of basic 
medical science, and the working knowledge of 
experienced clinicians to successively lower levels, 
conforms strictly to a logical positivist philosophical 
stance. The “de-emphasis” of medical knowledge, as 
opposed to probabilistically framed information from 
clinical research, can be interpreted as a rejection of 
common sense realism, in the sense formulated by Bhaskar 
[88-90], and a countervailing embrace of nominalism, as 
acknowledged earlier by Sackett [39,69]. Furthermore, the 
relegation of clinical acumen to the lowest rung on the 
EBM ladder is highly suggestive of logical positivism’s 
rejection of values, intuition, social interaction, empathy 
and tacit awareness as sources of knowledge [69]. 
Although EBM advocates later claimed to be regretful of 
their apparent dismissal of value laden considerations, 
particularly those of patients, as having bearing on 
healthcare decision-making [91,92], the persistent 
relegation of “expert experience” to the lowest rung of the 
EBM ladder within even the most recent iterations of the 
EBM credo [17] attests to the fact that, over the three 
decades since its first formulation, from an epistemological 
standpoint, little if anything has changed within the 
underlying EBM paradigm. 
 
The crucial, person-centered inversion 
 
If we turn the unhappy, ‘upside down’, hierarchical scheme 
posed by the EBM movement in 1992 right side up again, 
a remarkable transformation takes place; we are suddenly 
confronted by a plausible nested hierarchy conforming to 
the previously suggested specifications! Indeed, the lowest 
level of the three pronged scheme, the domain of clinical 
research, nourishes the realm of expanding medical 
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knowledge and is subsumed within it. The second level is, 
in turn, subsumed within the highest level domain of 
relationally generated healthcare actions that draw upon 
the expertise, and shared medical knowledge, of the 
practitioner, the shared health and personal self-knowledge 
of patients and other recipients of healthcare (Figure 2B). 
The construct as a whole escapes not only the formal 
inconsistencies of the sundry but ill-formulated EBM 
‘hierarchies’, but also the latter’s highly constrained form 
of implied logical positivism and Popper’s expanded 
‘falsificationist’ form in addition [52]. The emergent, self-
organizing properties of effective use of information and 
knowledge in healthcare, embodied in Montgomery’s use 
of the Aristotelian term “phronesis” (practical wisdom) 
[53], then come to the fore. The wise practitioner of course 
uses information from clinical research. The higher levels 
within this hierarchy in no sense invalidate or replace the 
lower, any more than a complex organism ceases to be 
made of atoms, or a reasoning person ceases to be an 
organism. Rather, the person-centered practitioner wisely 
applies information from clinical research and medical 
knowledge to the specific and potentially unique case 
which the individual person/s in front of her present. This 
ability entails a level of professional and personal 
development which requires, in addition to a proper 
understanding of the relevant clinical research, the human 
and social skills that allow a practitioner to identify with 
the needs and values of others - skills which defenders of 
person-centered care have noted are missing from the 
stripped-down, ‘biomedical reductionist’ [93,94] model of 
clinical decision-making. More concisely, such an 
approach requires a practitioner to activate and commit her 





If we have, hopefully, adequately illustrated the concept of 
a ‘hierarchy of hierarchies’ as it relates to issues 
surrounding the integration of research with the social and 
relational processes of healthcare, we still need to establish 
the usefulness and necessity of such a construct. One 
approach to this task would be simply to posit a world of 
healthcare in the absence of externally ordered and nested 
hierarchies of information and knowledge and to then 
imagine what it would look like.  Cases in which 
conventional hierarchical controls on research quality, such 
as those commonly used by developers of clinical 
guidelines, have broken down may be instructive here.  We 
may cite as examples the re-emergence of childhood 
infectious diseases in the wake of laxity in adoption of 
standard immunizations and the epidemic of deaths 
stemming from misuse of prescription opioid drugs. 
In the first example, a loosely designed, uncontrolled 
study reported an apparent association between childhood 
immunizations and autism [95]. The weaknesses of the 
study were quickly identified and it was ultimately 
assessed to have been based upon fabricated data [96]. The 
original report was retracted by the journal that had 
published it. Despite this, the publication that had created 
the controversy was widely disseminated and frequently 
cited in the peer reviewed literature as well as in the lay 
press and social media. It ultimately became the rallying 
cry for an expanding mistrust of immunizations within the 
lay public and consumer advocacy groups internationally. 
It is thought that the Wakefield study has been responsible 
for declining childhood immunization rates. Outbreaks of 
measles and polio with accompanying fatalities, polio 
having been once thought to be near eradication as a result 
of the vaccine, are being reported on several continents 
[97-99]. 
The second example traces to an errant 1980 report 
which was published as a letter to the New England 
Journal of Medicine [100]. The one hundred word Letter to 
the Editor by-passed the normal peer review process. It 
was based on an unstructured retrospective review of 
poorly identified medical records of patients admitted to 
hospital over an undisclosed time period and it concluded 
that “addiction is rare” among hospitalized patients 
receiving opiates [100]. The letter was seized upon by 
vested interests within the pharmaceutical industry as proof 
that opioid medications could be safely prescribed to any 
and all patients with painful conditions irrespective of 
etiology [101]. It is estimated that 200,000 adults in the US 
alone died of narcotic overdoses between 1999 and 2016 
[102]. 
The above two examples demonstrate that even  over-
simplified, flawed, design-based criteria for assessment of 
research quality may serve to protect the public from 
relatively disastrous consequences that may ensue when 
individuals and corporations with vested self-interests and 
ample resources are given a free hand in the conduct and 
dissemination of clinical research. As previously noted, the 
privileged position of randomized trials atop the traditional 
design based hierarchy dates from regulatory and 
legislative interventions in the late 1960’s that resulted 
from the thalidomide debacle [25,84]. Hence, the advent of 
the ordered hierarchy of designs dominated by randomized 
trial evidence was adaptive from the perspective of societal 
and ultimately individual patient needs. The rationale for 
even an imperfect and epistemologically flawed ‘hierarchy 
of research evidence’ is not merely an abstract 
philosophical issue of interest within academic circles, but 
is rather one of social responsibility, and one that carries 
important consequences to individuals, their families and 
Society. 
Turning to positive arguments for the necessity of 
properly framed evolutionary hierarchies, perhaps the most 
eloquent have been advanced by Michael Polanyi 
[103,104]. In a 1968 article published in Science [104] that 
author constructed an elegant demonstration of why life 
forms, machines and human consciousness cannot be 
derived from the linear laws of chemistry and physics, 
even though the latter are necessarily obeyed at every 
level. As one moves from inorganic matter to the 
emergence of life forms, the latter are made up of the 
materials and building blocks that comprise the former. 
Laws of entropy, conservation of momentum etc., are 
obeyed within the higher sphere; however, the life forms 
themselves cannot be derived from those laws. Polanyi 
traces the process of emergence through the universe of 
animals, within which tools are developed, identified and 
used. Only humanity, however, creates machines. Tools are 





essential to the building of machines but, again, one cannot 
derive the machines themselves from the tools that are 
used to make them, nor from the laws of chemistry and 
physics that prevail across the whole process.  In this way, 
it is demonstrated that one cannot comprehend the universe 
that contains all of these levels without recognizing the 
principle of an evolutionary hierarchy and the processes of 
emergence and self-organization that lead to and stem from 
it. 
Polanyi’s 1968 demonstration was directed to clarifying 
the necessary relationship between the coding structure of 
DNA, which had been discovered by Watson and Crick 
only a little more than a decade earlier [105] and the 
developmental processes that generate an individual 
organism, voice, words, grammatical syntax, language, and 
ultimately human consciousness. An analogous escalating 
hierarchical relationship can be demonstrated with respect 
to data, information, knowledge, and knowledge for action, 
or phronesis [106]. Recognition of such a nested hierarchy 
is ultimately itself an epistemologically sensitive issue. 
Specifically, it requires recognition of the crucial 
distinction between information and knowledge. Such a 
distinction is ultimately excluded within, for example, 
Popper’s scheme. For Popper, knowledge is that which is 
contained in books and the domain of ‘pure knowledge’ is 
ultimately a repository of information from various sources 
that is potentially on tap for instrumental use [52]. The 
EBM movement, similarly, denies a qualitative distinction 
between information, such as that which is generated by 
clinical research, and knowledge [86]. This is perhaps 
clearest insofar as, under the EBM paradigm [11], the 
information from clinical research is proposed to be of a 
higher order than what is otherwise commonly understood 
to constitute medical knowledge.  
Inquiries into the cognitive processes involved in 
everyday clinical and diagnostic reasoning provide an 
interesting domain of application of the above principle. 
Henry [1] highlights the importance of Polanyi’s concept 
of tacit knowing [103] to the role of pathophysiological 
knowledge and understanding in clinical practice. 
Supporting his suggestion, investigations of diagnostic 
reasoning in both experts and novices demonstrate that at 
least two phases of cognition are at play, namely a 
‘forward’ and a ‘backward’ reasoning process [107,108]. 
The former involves a process that resembles inductive 
reasoning and draws heavily upon background 
pathophysiological knowledge in a quasi-intuitive, non-
analytical fashion. The latter involves deliberative 
processing of specific pieces of information, such as 
elements of history and physical findings drawn from an 
individual patient, for purposes of verifying or falsifying 
hypotheses derived from the inductive process. It 
corresponds to an analytical, hypothetical-deductive, 
process. The balance between these two aspects of 
diagnostic reasoning may differ between novices and 
experts [107,108]. The latter appear to rely more on the 
non-analytical ‘forward reasoning’ process. Most useful for 
purposes of our discussion is the recognition that these, 
and perhaps other, cognitive dimensions are present 
whenever a clinical encounter takes place and that the 
process as a whole exemplifies the way that specific 
information, be it from a patient or from clinical research, 
interacts with and informs a growing wellspring of 
underlying knowledge.  
Provided we have an epistemologically competent 
understanding of the nature of knowledge, a nested 
hierarchy fulfilling the previously proposed specifications 
is defined through the escalation from data (defined as that 
which is transmissible via various electronic channels such 
as computers), through information (which may be simple 
factual or more complex but which requires some 
interpretive inputs on the part of a user), to knowledge 
(requiring  integration with other domains of discipline and 
experience) and, finally, to the realm of judicious and 
concerted action, or wisdom. 
The foregoing example is, for simplicity, confined to 
the domain of a single mind, that of the practitioner. To 
more fully recognize the qualitative, hierarchical, 
distinction between information and knowledge, it is 
necessary to escape the constraints of the traditional 
opposition of subject and object, the knower and thing 
known. The ineliminable qualititative component of 
hierarchy can only proceed from the judging, evaluating, 
knowing subject, and this subject’s information-organising 
activity must now be recognized as having a proper role in 
the development and application of medical science [109]. 
A realist interpretation of social constructivism constitutes 
one such avenue of escape; the Chilean school of 
evolutionary neuroscience [57], which could also be 
considered philosophically to be a stream or variant within 
social constructivism, constitutes another. It would be 
difficult to imagine a more eloquent formulation of the 
social constructivist concept of knowledge than that 
penned by the renowned Brazilian educator and education 
theorist, Paulo Freire: 
 
“Knowledge does not extend from those who consider 
they know to those who consider they do not know. 
Knowledge is built in the relationship between human 
beings and perfects itself in the Critical Problematization 
of these relations” [60]. 
 
The epistemology of a healthcare of the person, as 
opposed to simply informed treatment of patients on the 
part of well meaning but ultimately paternalistic 
practitioners, requires a vision of knowledge that 
transcends the simple storage and imparting of 
information. Realization of such a vision completes a 






The phrase “patient-centered medicine” was first coined by 
the Balints, Michael and Enid, in the context of having 
conducted a unique seminar for primary care practitioners 
in London during the 1950’s [110,111]. Their approach 
drew on principles of psychoanalysis applied to general 
health issues and emphasized the importance of relational 
principles across the full spectrum of protagonists in the 
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primary care setting [111]. It also opened the door to active 
consideration of the asymmetric unity of subject and 
object, of knower and known, and, implicitly, the 
personhood of both patient and practitioner within a 
productive clinical relationship. The Balints, however, 
stopped short of attempting to elaborate their vision in a 
fashion that identified salient issues of epistemology. Over 
the ensuing six decades, as the concept of patient-centered 
healthcare was explored and developed at the University of 
Rochester in the US and elsewhere [112], and as multiple 
independent initiatives described alternatives to the 
paternalistic medical model that had dominated healthcare 
since the days of Hippocrates, attention to the relevant 
epistemology of healthcare relationships and actions 
continued to be rare.  Ultimately, Balints’ phrase ‘patient-
centered care’ went the way of all buzzwords [22], taking 
on a multiplicity of meanings that would have certainly 
been unrecognizable to its initiators [24]. 
The Relationship Centered Care (RCC) initiative 
sponsored by the Pew and Fetzer Foundations in the early 
1990’s [48,113] marked an important milestone in the 
productive linkage of healthcare constructs and the 
domains of philosophy and epistemology. It also embodied 
a return to the relational principles embedded in the 
Balints’ formulations and reports.  Specifically, the RCC 
authors related the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and 
the concepts introduced by Polanyi to the recognition of 
the primacy of relational principles in defining the 
processes of healthcare and clinical practice. As with the 
Balints, in RCC both practitioner and patient share the 
affective, and not only the factual and ‘professional’ 
dimensions of the interactions. It is this that defines the 
personhood of all parties and protagonists and that creates 
the social context within which knowledge, understanding, 
decisions and actions can be mutually satisfying. Within 
that framework, the RCC authors recognized the 
importance of integration of information from clinical 
research into the social processes of healthcare at the same 
time that they established the necessary dominion of those 
processes over research and the mere exchange of 
information [113]. 
More recently still, the elaboration of the “mindlines” 
construct by Gabbay and Le May [113] also identified with 
philosophical currents within the social constructivist 
stream. Gabbay and Le May conducted ethnographic 
studies within several clinics within the UK that had been 
independently recognized as outstanding from a quality of 
care standpoint.  Specifically, they observed the use of 
information from clinical research and guidelines within 
the multidisciplinary social processes of the clinics in 
question. They found that the practitioners were conversant 
with the latest studies and recommendations but not in a 
fashion that conforms to the practice models proposed by 
EBM founders [114]. That is, they did not take time out 
from practice to access research reports or guidelines, even 
though ready availability of computerized electronic 
resources would have allowed them to do so. Rather, 
practitioners’ reference to and use of such information was 
at all points integrated into the social interactions of the 
clinic staff, which included meetings in which specific 
cases and clinical issues were discussed. Hence, within the 
high quality real world clinical settings observed by 
Gabbay and Le May, information generated by research 
and recommendations thereof served to inform and 
enhance clinical practice through integration into social 
processes, but never took center stage over the form and 
content of those processes.  Subsequent work of the 
authors has taken the form of development of approaches 
based upon their proposed ‘mindlines’ construct and has 
involved fostering evidence enriched communities of 
practice and learning communities within established 
healthcare environments [115,116]. 
Several points of coherence between the above cited 
frameworks and the epistemological issues discussed in 
this chapter are worthy of emphasis. Firstly, in both cases, 
social processes and relational principles supersede  the 
‘objective’ interpretation of information from clinical 
research in driving the processes of clinical care. Secondly, 
both the RCC initiative and the investigational perspectives 
of Gabbay and Le May seek to integrate enhanced 
attention to the results of clinical research as essential 
features of efforts to improve the quality of healthcare. The 
principles inherent in the properly defined evolutionary 
hierarchy of information, knowledge and action, or 
‘wisdom’, are prominently displayed in these two 
approaches. 
Earlier in this chapter we made note of the persistent 
and unsatisfying  gap between the domain of clinical 
research and that of clinical practice that characterizes the 
world of healthcare. An important feature of this 
disconnect is the unidirectional nature of most attempts to 
close the gap in question. Drawing on a concept originally 
developed within the world of business and marketing 
[117], they reflect a “push” orientation. Research designed 
and conducted within an environment foreign to that of 
clinical practice or policy development is ‘pushed’ upon 
leaders and practitioners within the latter contexts. This is a 
losing strategy within healthcare, dominated by individuals 
such as physicians, who have been trained to make life and 
death decisions on behalf of patients, for whose wellbeing 
they are uniquely responsible and who necessarily believe 
first and foremost in their own adequate competency in 
doing so. Inhabitants of the world of healthcare policy and 
practice perceive that of research to constitute an ‘ivory 
tower’, divorced from the real life world that they inhabit 
and unlikely to have trustworthy products or advice to 
offer it. 
A possible alternative, the so-called ‘pull’ approach, 
was suggested in the course of a lecture delivered in 2009 
by Professor Kenneth Prewitt of the Columbia University 
School of International and Public Affairs [118] and was 
echoed in the previously cited report of the US National 
Research Council which Professor Prewitt chaired [27]. 
Prewitt suggests that, instead of researchers 
conceptualizing and generating their products within the 
insulated environments of academia, or the profit oriented 
environment of private industry, they interact with and 
ultimately defer to the communities within which those 
products are proposed to be used and generate their 
research ideas and approaches in the context of those 
interactions.  Such an approach is consistent with the 
‘communities of practice’ framework described by Gabbay 
and Le May [114]. It would seem that equality of 
personhood within the clinical relationships, coexisting 





with the inherently asymmetrical element dictated by the 
professional training, expertise and responsibilities of the 
practitioner, mandates that the relationship and 
communications go beyond the confines of a mere 
exchange of information [37]. On a level that transcends 
the quality of relevant research, the ‘relational validity’ of 
the resulting context needs to be maximized. 
Engagement of stakeholders, including patients and 
healthcare consumers, in efforts such as the development 
of clinical guidelines, constitutes another relationally-
based approach to closing the gap. To be effective, such 
efforts need to be approached in such a way that the 
stakeholders neither feel ‘left out’ amidst an 
epidemiologically driven ‘boys club’, nor under pressure to 
turn themselves into ‘grass roots epidemiologists’ [119]. 
Irrespective of issues of relative effectiveness of different 
relationally based approaches, it seems unlikely that the 
gap between clinical research and healthcare practice will 
do anything but continue to widen unless and until relevant 
efforts reflect a viable epistemological foundation. 
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